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Abstract: Focussing on the period from 1948 to 1997, this paper examines the 
history of rationing in the British National Health Service (NHS), with special 
reference to the role of hospital accounting in this context. The paper suggests that 
concerns regarding rationing first emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in response to 
the application of economic theories to the health services, and that rationing only 
became an issue of wider concern when the NHS increasingly came to resemble 
economic models of health services in the early 1990s. The paper moreover argues 
that, unlike in the US, hospital accounting did not play a significant role in 
allocating or withholding health resources in Britain. Rudimentary information 
systems as well as resistance from medical professionals are identified as 
significant factors in this context. 
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Introduction  
 
The cost of health care in many developed countries is high and rising. In Britain, for 
example, the proportion of GDP spent on the NHS has increased from 3.5 % in 1950 
to 8.2 % in 2010 (Harker, 2012)1. Governments across the globe have adopted a range 
of health-service reforms during the last 30 years in an effort to contain the costs of 
health care. Accounting has played an important role in this context. In Britain, a 
succession of governments has instigated a sequence of hospital accounting reforms 
including ‘management budgets’, ‘resource management’, ‘reference costing’ and 
‘payment by results’ since the 1980s (DHSS, 1983; DoH, 1989, 1997, 2002).  
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Despite such sustained attempts to make health services more efficient and economic, 
it is frequently suggested that the central ambition of the NHS, namely the provision 
of all beneficial health care free at the point of use, is not sustainable. From the 1990s 
onwards, a wide range of commentators have voiced concerns regarding the rationing 
of health care with many suggesting that it was ‘inevitable’ (e.g. Coulter and Ham, 
2000; Harrison and Hunter, 1994; New, 1997).  
 
Against the background of such concerns, the rationing of health care emerged as a 
significant subject of social science research over the last two decades (e.g. Coulter 
and Ham, 2000; Harrison and Hunter, 1994; Hunter, 1997; Klein, Day and Redmayne, 
1996; New and Le Grand, 1996). Whilst these studies provided significant insights 
into the rationing of health care, two shortcomings of this literature can be identified. 
Firstly, the extant literature has a strong focus on the present and future of health-care 
rationing. Its history, alternatively, has attracted little attention from researchers. 
Secondly, despite suggestions that hospital accounting is centrally implicated in the 
rationing of health care in the USA (Fleck, 1987; Preston, Chua and Neu, 1997), the 
role of hospital accounting in health-care rationing in the context of more socialised 
health systems like the NHS remains largely unexplored.  
 
The present study seeks to address both of these perceived shortcomings by 
examining the history of health-care rationing in the NHS with special reference to 
the role of hospital accounting in this context. The study focusses on the period 
between the creation of the NHS in 1948 and the election of a Labour government in 
1997, which put a (temporary) halt to the market-based health-service reforms the 
departing Conservative administration had introduced from the 1980s onwards. The 
next section discusses extant literatures on health-care rationing and hospital 
accounting, as well as the methodology employed by this paper. The subsequent 
section examines the history of rationing in the NHS between 1948 and 1989. It 
argues that concerns regarding rationing first emerged in response to the application 
of economic theory to the health services but remained subdued as neither the 
behaviour of patients and doctors complied with the predictions of economic models. 
Hospital accounting only played a marginal role in rationing debates as well as in 
NHS resource allocation processes more generally. The next section suggests that 
wider concerns regarding the rationing of health care in Britain emerged against the 
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background of the Working for Patients reforms (DoH, 1989), which sought to recast 
the NHS in the image of economic theories of health care. It also suggests that the 
government’s ambition for accounting to play a central role in allocating health-care 
resources failed to materialise due to deficiencies in NHS information systems and 
unwillingness among medical professionals to engage with financial information. The 
final section summarises and concludes the paper.  
 
Literature Review and Methods 
 
Health-care rationing and hospital accounting have attracted considerable attention 
from academics over the last two decades. This section offers brief introductions to 
these literatures with an emphasis on historical studies, followed by an overview of 
the methods employed by the present study.   
 
Rationing Health Care 
 
The rationing of health care, which Schmidt (2004) defines as policies that cause 
patients to ‘forego medically beneficial treatment within a collectively financed 
(insurance or tax-based) system of health care provision’ (p. 970), emerged as an 
important theme in British health-policy discourses in the 1990s. In close succession 
to each other, a large number of books and articles were published on this subject (e.g. 
Coulter and Ham, 2000; Doyal, 1997; Harrison and Hunter, 1994; Hunter, 1997; 
Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996; New and Le Grand, 1996; Weale, 1998). Written by 
economists, doctors and social policy experts, virtually all of these contributions 
suggested that the rationing of health care was ‘inevitable’. It was argued that due to 
factors like ageing populations and advances in medical technology, demand for 
health services would necessarily outstrip supply within a system in which care was 
provided free at the point of use (e.g. Coulter and Ham, 2000; Hunter, 1997; New and 
Le Grand, 1996).  
 
Academic work in this area has been firmly focussed on the present and future of 
health-care rationing. Its past, alternatively, has attracted relatively little interest from 
researchers. A few of the contributions cited above have, however, offered brief 
accounts of the historical development of health-care rationing as part of wider 
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examinations of the topic (Hunter, 1997; Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996; New and 
Le Grand, 1996). These sources suggested that the rationing of health services was 
not a recent phenomenon but one of the defining characteristics of the NHS 
throughout its history. They argued that cash-limited budgets and tight expenditure 
controls meant that the NHS was a ‘monument to institutionalised scarcity’ virtually 
from day one of its operation (Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996, 37; New and Le 
Grand, 1997). Yet, despite such severe resource constraints, these studies noted that 
‘there was little – if any – public discussion of rationing’ in the early decades on the 
NHS (Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996, 40; Hunter, 1997). All three historical 
accounts examined this apparent contradiction between significant under-resourcing 
and the absence of concerns regarding rationing. They explained this absence by 
suggesting that medical decisions served as an implicit rationing mechanism (Hunter, 
1997; Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996; New and Le Grand, 1996). More specifically, 
it was argued that their expertise allowed doctors to create ‘the illusion that decisions 
about whether or not to treat a condition and how were the result of clinical 
considerations rather than resource constraints’ (Hunter, 1997, 38). The slow adoption 
of the expensive but potentially life-saving technology of renal dialysis, for example, 
was explained in terms of the benefits of concentrating medical expertise in a small 
number of specialist treatment centres (Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996).  
 
The detailed consideration of the absence of concerns regarding rationing offered by 
these studies was not matched by a similarly thorough examination of early discourses 
on rationing in Britain. Klein, Day and Redmayne (1996) briefly noted that rationing 
was first explicitly discussed by Powell (1966) and subsequently the subject of a book 
by Cooper (1975), before suggesting that neither contribution resonated with the 
British public. Hunter (1997) and New and Le Grand (1996) did not discuss the initial 
emergence of British discourses on rationing at all. As a result, whilst providing 
insights into why rationing was not perceived as a significant problem before the 
1990s, these three historical accounts tell us little about how concerns regarding 
rationing first emerged in the UK.  
 
Hospital Accounting 
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Since the 1980s, the hospital has been a significant site for accounting research. Much 
of this research has adopted case study approaches to examine the effects of ‘New 
Public Management’ (NPM) reforms on hospitals, doctors and their patients (e.g. 
Chua, 1995; Jones and Dewing, 1997; Kurunmaki, 2004; Llewellyn and Northcott, 
2005; Lowe, 2000; Lowe and Doolin, 1999; Preston, Cooper and Coombs, 1992). 
Consistent with calls to extend historical studies of accounting beyond their 
traditional focus on business organisations (e.g. Miller, Hopper and Laughlin, 1991; 
Walker, 2008a, 2008b), hospital accounting also emerged as a subject of historical 
inquiry from the 1990s onwards (e.g. Bracci, Maran and Vagnoni, 2010; Gebreiter, 
2015; Holden, Funnell and Oldroyd, 2009; Jackson, 2012; Jackson et al., 2013; Jones 
and Mellett, 2007; Preston, 1992; Robbins and Lapsley, 2008; Robson, 2003, 2007; 
Samuel, Dirsmith and McElroy, 2005). The resulting literature developed a strong 
focus on examining the relationship between hospital accounting and a wide range of 
factors in its social and institutional environment. For example, a series of articles by 
Robson (2003, 2006, 2007) investigated how ‘dominant individuals’ such as Henry 
Burdett and Joseph Edmund Stone, institutions like the King’s Fund, and wider 
‘political and economic forces’ have shaped British hospital accounting between the 
late 19th century and the mid-1970s. Other studies have examined how notions of 
philanthropy and morality (Holden, Funnel and Oldroyd, 2009; Jackson, 2012), 
developments in economics and engineering (Samuel, Dirsmith and McElroy, 2005), 
varying levels of government interference (Scott, McKinnon and Harrison, 2003) and 
changes in social organising principles (Jones and Mellett, 2007) have affected the 
historical development of hospital accounting practices.  
 
The resource constraints experienced by health services around the world also form an 
important element of the social and institutional context of hospital accounting 
practices. In particular, the rising cost of health services, which is often attributed to 
technological progress and ageing populations, has frequently been discussed by the 
extant literature in order to contextualise, explain, justify or promote hospital 
accounting reforms (e.g. Cardinaels and Soderstrom, 2013; Chapman, Kern and 
Laguecir, 2014; Hopwood, 1992; Jones and Mellett, 2007; Kurunmaki, Lapsley and 
Melia, 2006; Lapsley and Schofield, 2009). Despite the high profile that it has 
enjoyed in public-policy debates over the last few decades, rationing and its 
relationship with hospital accounting have received less attention from accounting 
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researchers, historical or contemporary. Only two studies, both of which focussed on 
the role of DRGs2 in rationing health care in the USA, have addressed this issue. 
Fleck (1987), a philosopher, suggested that the introduction of DRGs in 1983 
provided the US government with an ‘invisible’ mechanism for rationing health care. 
He argued that DRGs allowed the government to localise and privatise politically 
sensitive decisions regarding the allocation of life-prolonging resources. Preston, 
Chua and Neu (1997) similarly suggested that the introduction of DRGs effaced the 
political nature of rationing decisions. They argued that the DRG system acted as a 
‘black box’ in the sense that it provided an ‘inscrutable’ rationing mechanism that was 
‘little understood by most actors and generally believed to be correct’ (p. 159). The 
role of accounting in rationing health care beyond the United States however remains 
largely unexplored.  
 
This paper pursues two objectives. Firstly, it aims to re-examine the history of 
rationing in the NHS. Unlike previous histories on this subject, which have focussed 
on explaining why rationing was not perceived as a problem in the early NHS, this 
paper examines how concerns regarding rationing first emerged in Britain during the 
1960s and 1970s, and how they proliferated in the 1990s. Secondly, the paper seeks to 
examine the potential role of accounting in rationing health care in the British NHS 
and thereby extend our understanding of this issue beyond the specific context of the 
USA, where previous studies on this topic were located.  
 
In pursuing these two objectives, the paper draws on a range of documentary 
materials including books, reports and government publications as well as 
professional journals such as the British Medical Journal, The Hospital3, The 
Accountant and The Lancet. These professional journals were particularly suited for 
the purposes of this paper as they provided a continuous record of debates regarding 
health-care funding, rationing and accounting throughout the period investigated. 
Whilst this record was necessarily partial, it reflected a wide variety of perspectives 
including those of accountants, health economists, hospital administrators and 
medical professionals. Contributions which concerned themselves with health-care 
rationing, resource allocation, hospital accounting and related topics were selected 
from the sources listed above and analysed.  
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Resources, Resource Allocation and Rationing in the NHS 1948 - 1989 
 
This section examines the history of resource allocation and rationing in the NHS 
between its creation in 1948 and the publication of the Working for Patients White 
Paper (DoH, 1989). The next sub-section focusses on the history of resource 
allocation generally, whilst the subsequent sub-section focusses specifically on the 
small number of explicit references to health-care rationing during this period.  
 
Resources and Resource Allocation 
 
On 5 July 1948, the vast majority of British hospitals entered into public ownership to 
form the NHS. From this day onwards, all British citizens would have access to health 
care on the basis of need rather than their ability to pay. Despite making medical care 
available free at the point of use to the entire population, the then government and 
other commentators were not concerned by the cost implications of nationalising the 
health service. Following the reasoning outlined in the Beveridge Report, it was 
widely believed that providing free access to health care would cure existing disease 
and prevent future disease (Beveridge, 1942). The nationalised service would make 
people not only healthier but also more productive. The cost of the service to the 
Treasury, initially estimated at approximately £150m for the financial year 1948/49, 
was thought to remain constant or even decrease in the future.  
 
It soon became apparent that the government had underestimated the costs of the 
newly created health service. By 1949-1950, the cost of the NHS had increased to 
£359m. The higher than anticipated cost of the service caused great concern amongst 
politicians, doctors and accountants. Controlling the cost of health care became the 
most pressing health policy issue of the early 1950s. In 1950-1951 the government 
introduced a number of measures which it hoped would have an immediate effect on 
health-care costs. These measures included the imposition of a cash limit on the NHS 
budget and the introduction of charges for dentures, spectacles and prescriptions. In 
addition to these rather crude measures, a wide range of commentators called for the 
adoption of cost accounting in the hospital service (BMJ, 1952; The Accountant, 
1952; The Lancet, 1952). According to these commentators, a departmental hospital 
costing system modelled on those used in industry would provide for efficiency, 
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economy and cost control in the nationalised hospital service. In response to these 
suggestions, the Ministry of Health (MoH) commissioned four reports on hospital 
costing in the early 1950s (King’s Fund, 1952; MoH, 1955; Nuffield Trust, 1952; 
RHBT, 1952), which paved the way for the nationwide introduction of a departmental 
costing system in April 1957.  
 
Concerns regarding the cost of health care remained significant until 1956, when the 
Committee of Enquiry into the Cost of the NHS, which the government had 
commissioned in 1953, published its report (Guillebaud, 1956). This report suggested 
that the steep increases in health expenditure during the early years of the NHS did 
not reflect any fundamental flaws in the economic viability of the service but had 
been caused by general inflation and a back-log of demand for dentures and 
spectacles. The report concluded that the NHS had made efficient use of the resources 
dedicated to it and recommended that capital expenditure in particular ought to be 
increased rather than decreased. The findings of the Guillebaud Report put an (at least 
temporary) end to concerns regarding the cost of health care and both main political 
parties promised to increase health expenditure at subsequent general elections (Klein, 
2006). The departmental costing system was introduced into the NHS in 1957, a year 
after the publication of the Guillebaud Report. Partly because concerns regarding the 
cost of health care had subsided by then, and partly due to the perceived limitations of 
the system, departmental costing did not go on to play a central role in the 
management of the NHS in general, or in resource allocation decisions in particular 
(c.f. Bourn and Ezzamel, 1986; Robson, 2003). Departmental costing was criticised 
for being over-elaborate and unresponsive to the needs of administrators (Hunt, 1961; 
Langley, 1961). It was moreover criticised for its strong focus on administrative 
efficiency and its inability to account for the cost implications of clinical decisions, 
which were increasingly highlighted as the ultimate drivers of hospital costs from the 
mid-1960s onwards (e.g. Feldstein, 1967; MoH, 1965). The control of expenditure in 
the NHS was exercised by means of fixed macro budgets, whilst local resources were 
allocated on the basis of clinical decisions, which were beyond the scope of 
departmental costing and whose autonomy ‘remained sacrosanct’ (Robson, 2003, 117; 
Gebreiter, 2015).  
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From the 1960s to the 1980s, NHS expenditure experienced several periods of high 
and low growth depending on the general economic situation and government 
spending priorities. The general trend in health expenditure was, however, upward as 
the cost of the NHS to the Treasury increased from 3.1% of GDP in 1960 to 5% in 
1980 (Harker, 2012). Concerns regarding the allocation of funds within the service 
emerged at various points during this period, most notably in the 1970s. New 
approaches towards resource allocation were considered at both the macro- and the 
micro-levels. Hospital accounting would come to play virtually no role at the macro-
level and a small but increasing role at the micro-level.  
 
With regard to resource allocation at the macro-level, it must be noted that the share 
of the NHS budget allocated to England’s 14 Regional Health Authorities had initially 
been based on the regions’ hospital expenditure prior to nationalisation. As a result, 
affluent areas in the south of the country were allocated a relatively higher share of 
NHS resources than were poorer northern areas. Inflation-linked budget increases 
perpetuated this discrepancy during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1976, the government 
accepted proposals by the Resource Allocation Working Party which outlined a new 
allocation mechanism based on standardised mortality ratios (DHSS, 1976). This 
mechanism was thought to ensure that NHS funds would be allocated according to 
regional health-care needs rather than historical coincidence. The Working Party 
made no reference to a potential role for hospital accounting in this context. Others 
noted that emerging accounting technologies like ‘specialty costing’ could have been 
used to adjust regional health budgets for patients who were referred for treatment at 
hospitals pertaining to other health authorities (e.g. Magee and Osmolski, 1978). This 
approach was, however, not widely adopted.  
 
Hospital accounting was to play a more prominent role in the context of resource 
allocation at the micro level. Starting with the publication of the Cogwheel Report 
(MoH, 1967), there was an increasing emphasis on the resource implications of 
individual clinical decisions in the NHS. Suggestions emerged that doctors ought to 
become more conscious of the costs associated with their choices. Consistent with 
these suggestions, a number of experiments were conducted with costing systems 
whose aim was to provide clinically relevant cost information to doctors during the 
1970s (e.g. Babson, 1973; Coles, Davison and Wickings, 1976; Russell, 1974). Coles, 
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Davison and Wicking’s (1976) contribution attracted particular attention, as it 
suggested that the introduction of clinical budgets at Westminster Hospital had 
resulted in significant clinician involvement and cost savings. Expectations were 
raised that accounting would come to play a central role in the micro-allocation of 
health resources. However, Coles, Davison and Wicking’s (1976) findings could not 
be replicated at other hospitals and the production of clinically-relevant cost 
information remained restricted to a small number of experimental sites during the 
1970s (DHSS, 1978; Perrin, 1978).  
 
As low economic growth, high inflation and growing social unrest culminated in the 
‘winter of discontent’ of 1978-1979, Britain elected a Conservative government 
which, inspired by neo-liberal ideas, envisioned that accounting would play a central 
role in micro-level allocation of NHS resources. The government’s vision of a 
reformed health service was articulated by the NHS Management Inquiry (DHSS, 
1983), which was conducted by Roy Griffiths, the deputy chairman of a supermarket 
chain. A central recommendation of the Griffiths Report was the creation of 
management budgets, a form of clinical budgeting. Its aim was to highlight to 
clinicians the cost implications of their decisions and to engage them with resource 
management. Management budgets were trialled at four test sites across England but 
received only a ‘lukewarm’ reception by clinicians, who criticised the cost 
information at the heart of management budgeting as ‘crude’ and ‘unacceptable’ 
(Stewart, 1984, 731-732). In 1986, the government had to abandon the four test sites 
and the label ‘management budgets’ as initial scepticism amongst local clinicians had 
turned into outright hostility (DHSS, 1986). With small modifications, and re-branded 
as the ‘resource management initiative’, management budgeting experiments resumed 
at other locations (e.g. Perrin, 1988; Preston, Cooper and Coombs, 1992). Alongside 
medical audit, the empowerment of patients and the separation of purchasers and 
providers of health care, the government envisioned the resource management 
initiative to form one of the central pillars of the post-Working for Patients NHS 
(DoH, 1989).  
 
Rationing 
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Having briefly discussed the history of resource allocation in the NHS between 1948 
and 1989 in general terms in the previous sub-section, the present sub-section 
focusses specifically on sources which discussed health-care rationing in explicit 
terms during this period. As noted by previous histories (Hunter, 1997; Klein, Day 
and Redmayne, 1996), these were small in number. The very first author to address 
this topic was Enoch Powell, a Conservative politician and former Minister of Health, 
whose convictions placed him on the right wing of his political party. At a time when 
economists first started to apply their theories to the health services (Feldstein, 1967; 
Klarman, 1965), and against the background of initiatives to strengthen the role of 
quantitative expertise in government (e.g. Fulton, 1968), Powell (1966) published his 
reflections on the present and future states of the health services. Powell’s (1966) 
contribution included a chapter entitled ‘Supply and Demand’, in which he mobilised 
these two concepts borrowed from economics to argue that health care was being 
rationed in the NHS. With regard to the latter of the two concepts, Powell (1966) 
described as ‘absurd’ the ‘vulgar assumption […] that there is a definable amount of 
medical care “needed”, and that if that “need” was met, no more would be demanded’ 
(p. 26). Instead, he argued that there is ‘virtually no limit on the amount of medical 
care an individual is capable of absorbing’ (Powell, 1966, 26-27). This ‘infinity of 
demand’, Powell (1966) argued, was not mitigated by pricing mechanisms because 
‘medical care under the National Health Service is rendered free to the consumer at 
the point of consumption’ (p. 26). As a result, Powell (1966) concluded, ‘supply and 
demand are not kept in balance’ and ‘supply has to be rationed by means other than 
price’ (p. 26).  
 
Cooper (1975), the second writer to explicitly discuss this topic, similarly borrowed 
the notions of supply and demand to suggest that health care was being rationed in the 
NHS. In a chapter entitled ‘The need to ration’ (p. 46), Cooper (1975), a trained 
economist, elaborated Powell’s (1966) suggestions that a combination of almost 
infinite potential demand for health care and the provision of health services free at 
the point of use would inevitably result in rationing. Cooper’s (1975) specific 
argument follows:  
 
Rational economic behaviour dictates that an individual faced with a zero price (free) 
commodity or service will consume it until further consumption yields him or her no 
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further utility – that is until he has no further use for it. In the case of health this is 
likely to approach infinity or at any rate so high a level of consumption that is may as 
well be infinity. (pp. 46-50) 
 
The supply of health services, alternatively, was ‘constrained by the size of the 
current national tax receipts and the health service’s share of them’ (Cooper, 1975, 
50). Since, in a service free of charge at the point of use, this mismatch between 
supply and demand could not be resolved by means of price mechanisms, Cooper 
(1975) echoed Powell (1966) by concluding that ‘in the NHS rationing must take 
place in some other manner’ (p. 50).  
 
As demonstrated by the above paragraphs, the first suggestions that health services 
were rationed in the NHS were derived from economic theory. According to the 
teachings of economics, there was virtually no limit to the amount of health services 
that ‘health-care consumers’ would demand in the absence of price constraints. No 
health service, however well resourced or organised, would be able fulfil such an 
infinite demand for health care. As a result, the rationing of health care was not only 
deemed commonplace in the NHS but also inevitable. The real NHS, of course, was 
populated by patients rather than ‘rational consumers [who] go on demanding health 
care until its “marginal utility” approaches zero’ (Cooper, 1975, 25). Even Cooper 
(1975) recognised that British patients were extremely reluctant to adopt the role of 
health-care customers:  
 
Few people think of themselves as potential customers of the [health] system. When 
they are customers they are too ill, and when they have recovered they are too 
relieved to and thankful to complain. […] People are unaware of what is technically 
possible. They are unaware of the gross inequalities in provision and, for the most 
part, have gratefully accepted whatever they have found. (p. 93) 
 
More generally, British patients ‘demanded’ very little of the NHS. They displayed 
‘passivity in the face of long waiting lists’ (Frankel, 1992, 13) and a general attitude 
towards the health service which Klein (1984) characterised as ‘deferential’. A. 
number of commentators suggested that such behaviours reflected the origins of 
British hospitals as charitable or Poor Law institutions (Frankel, 1992; Powell, 1966). 
Aaron and Schwartz’s (1984) observation that the NHS, which covered approximately 
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50 million people, only received a total of 2809 malpractice claims during the first 25 
years of its existence provides a further indication that the early NHS served passive 
and deferential patients rather than rational health-care consumers.4 
 
In the real NHS, demand for health services was not determined by consumer 
preferences but by clinical decisions. During the first few decades of the NHS, such 
decisions were perceived as an art, which depended above all on the skill, intuition 
and experience of the individual clinician (e.g. Armstrong, 1977; Gebreiter, 2015). 
They were subjective, local and inseparable from the clinician taking them. Patients 
generally accepted clinical decisions unquestioningly, partly because of the great 
prestige and authority doctors commanded, and partly because the doctrine of ‘clinical 
freedom’ was seen to guarantee that doctors put the interests and well-being of their 
patients above all other considerations (e.g. Fox, 1951). The ultimate decision on who 
to treat, and who not to treat, was therefore the exclusive preserve of individual 
medical professionals.  
 
It is this ability to provide or withhold treatment on the basis of subjective clinical 
judgements which later sources argued was at the heart of a system of implicit 
rationing during the early decades of the NHS (e.g. Hunter, 1997; New and Le Grand, 
1996). Sources from the 1970s and 1980s suggest that the extent to which medical 
practice was affected by resource constraints and the degree to which doctors were 
complicit in such implicit rationing mechanisms is less clear-cut. Cooper (1975), for 
example, noted that doctors showed little awareness of their supposed role in 
rationing health care. A study by two American researchers (Aaron and Schwartz, 
1984), which suggested that health care was being rationed in Britain because 
utilisation rates of various treatments and diagnostic tools were significantly lower 
than those in the USA, also found conflicting evidence regarding the role of British 
doctors in rationing. Based on interviews with a wide range of doctors, they suggested 
that whilst some felt that resource considerations impinged on their practice, the 
majority indicated that their decisions to withhold treatment were made exclusively 
on medical grounds. Aaron and Schwartz (1984) did not take the latter suggestions at 
face value. They argued that ‘British doctors seem to seek medical justifications for 
decisions forced on them by resource limits’ and that, almost subconsciously, these 
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doctors ‘gradually redefine standards of care so that they can escape the constant 
recognition that financial limits compel them to do less than their best’ (p. 101).  
 
This assessment was only partially shared by Klein (1984), a British health policy 
researcher, who reviewed Aaron and Schwartz’s book for the British Medical 
Journal. Klein (1984) criticised that the book appeared to operate under the 
assumption that the USA provided the ‘optimum level’ of health care, hinting that 
differences in treatment rates between the UK and USA could be a function of over-
treatment in the USA rather than rationing in the UK.5 He moreover suggested that 
decisions to withhold treatment in Britain were as much reflective of clinical 
preferences as they were of resource constraints: 
 
[D]ifferences in the medical cultures of Britain and America are at least as important as differences in 
the availability of resources. The two are, to an extent, linked. A humane, clinical conservatism in 
Britain both sustains and is, in turn, reinforced by constraints in resources. A heroic, aggressive style of 
medicine in the United States helps to explain – and, in turn, to compound – the high rate of spending. 
(Klein, 1984, 143-144) 
 
The evidence presented in the above paragraphs provides some support for 
suggestions that doctors were complicit in an implicit system of rationing. It however 
also raises the possibility that the relatively low levels of health expenditure in the UK 
(as compared to, for example, the USA) reflected different incentives and a more 
conservative clinical culture. Where the balance lay between those two arguments 
cannot be determined with any degree of certitude on the basis of the available 
evidence. What can be said with more confidence, however, is that there was very 
little public debate on rationing in the NHS during the first four decades of its 
existence (cf. Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996; Hunter, 1997). Neither doctors, nor 
patients, nor the wider British public perceived rationing to be a significant problem. 
At a time when the health services were characterised by powerful, confident and 
autonomous doctors as well as trusting, passive and deferential patients, concerns 
regarding health-care rationing were largely restricted to the minds of a small number 
of economists and American commentators.  
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No reference was made to hospital accounting in early contributions on the subject of 
rationing in Britain. More generally, accounting played virtually no role in allocating 
funds within the NHS at the macro-level (DHSS, 1976), and only a tentative one at 
the micro-level (e.g. clinical budgeting). In a centralised, medically-dominated health 
service, clinical decisions and statistical tools like standardised mortality ratios were 
perceived as the appropriate basis for allocating resources at the micro- and macro-
levels respectively.  
 
The Emergence of Wider Concerns Regarding Health-Care Rationing 1989- 
1997 
 
This section discusses three significant developments which occurred in parallel in the 
wake of the ‘Working for Patients’ White Paper (DoH, 1989); namely the creation of 
an ‘internal market’, the erosion of professional power, and the emancipation of 
patients. It argues that as a result of these developments, the NHS increasingly came 
to resemble economic models of the health service and concerns regarding the 
rationing of health care proliferated. The section moreover discusses the role of 
accounting in this context, arguing that the government’s vision of accounting’s 
playing a central role in allocating (and withholding) health resources did not 
materialise due to professional resistance and an under-developed information 
infrastructure.  
 
The Internal Market 
 
The central component of the health-service reforms outlined by Working for Patients 
(DoH, 1989) was the creation of a quasi-market for hospital services by separating the 
‘purchasers’ of health care (i.e. Health Authorities) from its ‘providers’ (i.e. 
hospitals). Under this system, which came to be known as the ‘internal market’, local 
Health Authorities were to ‘contract’ out health services to a range of competing 
hospitals, including independent hospital trusts and private sector providers. These 
contracts would ‘spell out clearly what was required of each hospital in terms of price, 
quality and nature of the service to be provided’ (DoH, 1989, 24). 
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The government envisioned that hospital costing would play a two-fold role under the 
internal market. Firstly, it continued to emphasise clinical budgets and the associated 
aim of engaging doctors in resource management as key tools in increasing the 
efficiency of hospitals (DoH, 1989; Health Services Management; 1990; Coe-Legg, 
1990). In consequence, the White Paper (DoH, 1989) pledged to expand the resource 
management initiative and by November 1991 all large acute hospitals in England had 
started to implement it (Scott, 1991). However, the costing systems which supported 
resource management were basic and, crucially, did not account for the quality of 
clinical care which had traditionally been the principal concern of clinicians (e.g. 
Dearsden, 1990; Green and Harrison, 1989). In consequence, many doctors felt that 
the NHS costing systems could not adequately support their decision making and, 
with few exceptions (e.g. Moseley and Fairbanks, 1992), they remained reluctant to 
engage with cost information in the 1990s (e.g. Buckland, 1994; Jones and Dewing, 
1997).  
 
Secondly, the government envisioned that costing information would underpin the 
newly created ‘market’ for hospital services (DoH, 1989). Based on accurate cost 
information, hospitals would bid for contracts with Health Authorities, which would 
then select the most competitive provider. However, such ambitions were not 
compatible with the rudimentary information and costing systems operated by the 
NHS in the late 1980s (e.g. Perrin, 1988). In order to improve the costing information 
supporting the internal market, the government set up a National Casemix Office, 
encouraged the creation of Healthcare Resource Groups6 (Sanderson, 1992) and 
published a succession of ‘Costing for contracting manuals’ (e.g. NHS Executive, 
1993a, 1994a, 1994b). Despite these efforts, the cost information available to most 
British hospitals remained relatively basic and unable to account for the quality of 
medical care (NHS Executive, 1996) by the time the incoming Labour government 
abolished the internal market in 1997. A study published in the same year showed that 
not one of more than 100 NHS purchaser organisations surveyed was using the cost of 
Healthcare Resource Groups as a basis for contracting (NCO, 1997). Rather than 
relying on carefully-priced diagnostic groups, the purchasing activities of Health 
Authorities continued to rely on block contracts which covered a large and often fairly 
ill-defined set of services.  
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Although the contracting process largely failed to account for the precise price, nature 
and quality of the services provided, it did place some pressure on local Health 
Authorities to be more transparent in the allocation of resources. As a result, during 
the early 1990s, a number of authorities started to publish lists of health services that 
they were unwilling to fund (BMA, 1995; Klein and Redmayne, 1992). Whilst these 
lists consisted of marginal services like tattoo removal and the treatment of bat ears, 
they were a factor in bringing the issue of rationing to the attention of the wider public 
(cf. Klein, Day and Redmayne, 1996; Hunter, 1997).  
 
Doctors 
 
The decades that followed the creation of the NHS coincided with the ‘golden age’ of 
the medical profession (Abbott, 1988; Starr, 1982). Buoyed by medical breakthroughs 
ranging from the discovery of antibiotics to the performance of heart transplants, 
doctors were almost universally respected, trusted and admired. However, from the 
mid-1970s onwards, clinicians started to come under attack from a variety of angles. 
Marxists denounced them as agents of capitalist élites; nurses and other health service 
employees grew more confident and vocal; epidemiologists proposed that the 
increases in life expectancy during the twentieth century arose largely from public 
health and welfare measures rather than clinical interventions; and philosophers 
argued that the ‘medicalisation’ of society had done more harm than good (Illich, 
1975, Klein, 2006; McKeown, 1976; Preston, Cooper and Coombs, 1992).  
 
In addition to these critiques, changes within the medical profession also started to 
challenge the power of doctors. In particular, the emergence of new forms of medical 
knowledge was of relevance in this context. As suggested earlier, clinical knowledge 
had historically been perceived to be subjective and experience-based, and therefore 
inseparable from individual doctors (Armstrong, 1977; Gebreiter, 2015). From the 
1970s onwards, there was increasing interest in statistical approaches to clinical 
practice, including Bayesian models for diagnostic decision-making processes and 
randomised controlled trials to assess the effectiveness of a wide range of clinical 
interventions (e.g. Bunker, Barnes and Mosteller, 1977; Cochrane, 1972). The 
emergence of such explicit and universal notions of clinical decision making implied 
that medical knowledge could become accessible to non-clinical professionals.  
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The diminishing status of the medical profession was both reflected in and reinforced 
by government health policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Two policies in particular 
represented a challenge to professional power and autonomy. Firstly, Working for 
Patients called for the introduction of the medical audit, defined as ‘a systematic 
critical analysis of the quality of medical care, including the procedures used for 
diagnosis and treatment, the use of resources, and the resulting outcomes for the 
patient’ (DoH, 1989, 39). In the reformed NHS, every hospital doctor, including fully-
qualified consultants, would have their practice audited (Bowden and Walshe, 1991; 
DoH, 1989; Smith, 1990). Secondly, the government encouraged the development of 
clinical guidelines, documents which set out in considerable detail how specific 
diseases ought to be treated (e.g. NHS Executive, 1993b). Such guidelines, the 
government hoped, would inform clinical practice and form the basis of resource-
allocation decisions (NHS Executive, 1996). Implicit in these two policies was, of 
course, the suggestion that much of the clinical work performed across Britain was 
sub-standard and in need of monitoring and/or improvement.  
 
The decrease in trust, prestige and autonomy of the medical profession outlined in the 
above paragraphs is argued to be a significant factor in the emergence of concerns 
regarding health-care rationing during the 1990s. In this environment, it became 
increasingly difficult for doctors to determine the demand for health care by means of 
implicit decisions under the mantle of clinical autonomy. The wishes and choices of 
patients would play a much greater role in this context, as suggested by the next sub-
section.  
 
Patients 
 
The notion of the patient underwent significant changes in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Against the background of an increasingly consumerist society, the passive and 
deferential patient of the post-war decades would be replaced by a new, informed, 
vocal and assertive type of health-care consumer. The Conservative government was 
sympathetic towards this development and the White Paper (DoH, 1989) included a 
number of policy initiatives aimed at supporting patient choice.  
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As suggested by Greener’s (2009) history of consumerism in the British health 
services, patients had historically very little choice in the NHS. In theory, patients had 
enjoyed the right to move to another general practitioner if they were dissatisfied, but 
such action was neither encouraged nor common. This tendency was to change in the 
post-White Paper NHS. Under the internal market, ‘money will flow to where the 
patients are going’ and hospitals would be incentivised to ‘satisfy the needs and 
preferences of patients’ (DoH, 1989, 33). Patients would be encouraged to consider a 
wide range of options, ranging from ‘a real choice between GPs’ (p. 55) to purchasing 
optional extras such as single rooms or personal telephones when in hospital.  
 
In addition to patient choice, the government highlighted that patients needed to be in 
a good position to make their choices. Consistent with this, the White Paper (DoH, 
1989) outlined the government’s ambitions to make a wide range of information about 
the health services on offer available to patients, including ‘indicators of hospital 
performance which cover the quality as well as the efficiency of the services 
provided’ (p. 36). Once in hospital, patients would also get ‘clear and sensitive 
information of what is happening’ and advice on ‘clinical matters, such as the nature 
of an illness and its proposed treatment’ (p. 7).  
 
The government’s efforts to empower the users of health services resulted in the 
publication of the ‘Patient’s Charter’ (DoH, 1991), which set out a range of rights and 
‘encouraged individual patients to be more assertive in their use of services’ (Ham, 
1993, 2). Of course, many of the ambitions regarding patient choice and information 
outlined in Working for Patients and the Patient’s Charter remained just that. To this 
day, the NHS is struggling to develop practical performance indicators and many 
patients still expect doctors to make choices on their behalf (e.g. DoH, 2012). 
However, a growing number of patients started to assert their choices and wishes in 
the 1990s. A refusal to comply with those by doctors and health authorities was 
increasingly denounced as rationing. The tragic case of ‘Child B’ came to symbolise 
both the increased confidence and assertiveness of patients and the rising concerns 
regarding the rationing of health care in the 1990s. Child B was a 10 year old girl 
suffering from acute myeloid leukaemia. After an unsuccessful bone marrow 
transplant, the girl was refused further ‘aggressive’ treatment by NHS doctors on 
account of a low likelihood of success and the considerable pain and discomfort she 
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would suffer in the process. The girl’s father refused to accept the doctors’ judgement 
and took the NHS to court, which, against the background of considerable media 
coverage, ruled in support of the medical opinion. As a result of the publicity created 
by the case, a wealthy donor agreed to fund private treatment of Child B, which 
however proved unsuccessful (Hunter, 1997; New, 1997).   
 
As professional power declined, patients emancipated themselves and a quasi-market 
was created in which funds would follow the choices of health-care consumers, the 
NHS started to resemble the models of health services created by early health 
economists (e.g. Cooper, 1975). Doctors, under pressure from a range of 
constituencies including politicians, health economists and nurses, no longer had the 
undisputed power and authority to regulate the demand for health services. In the 
post-White Paper NHS, demand was increasingly determined by a new type of patient 
who was encouraged by various government policies to express her wishes and 
preferences (DoH, 1989, 1991). These new patients not only wanted high quality 
health care, but also wanted it promptly, on their terms and at their convenience. They 
would be the customers of the NHS, much like they were customers of any other 
business, with the crucial difference that in a health service free at the point of use, no 
price constraints would apply. As the resources available to the NHS were unlikely to 
increase significantly under the Conservative government, many observers believed 
that the health service would not be able to accommodate the new demands placed on 
it by health-care consumers. In consequence, many came to see the rationing of health 
care as inevitable (e.g. Coulter and Ham, 2000; Harrison and Hunter, 1994; New, 
1997).  
 
Similarly to the USA, where DRGs operated at the heart of health-care rationing 
(Fleck, 1987; Preston, Chua and Neu, 1997), the UK government had envisioned 
accounting playing a central role in allocating, as well as withholding, resources in a 
post-Working for Patients NHS (DoH, 1989). Such ambitions were frustrated by the 
information infrastructure and the reluctance of many doctors to engage with 
accounting information in the NHS, both of which are argued to reflect the 
historically nationalised and non-commercial nature of the service. Unlike in the 
USA, whose fee-for-service tradition meant that hospitals had elaborate information 
and billing systems in place (Preston, 1992), the NHS possessed only modest abilities 
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to record and price hospital activities in the late 1980s. Despite considerable 
investment in this area during the 1990s (e.g. NHS Executive, 1993a), the costing 
systems of most NHS hospitals remained unable to support the contracting process, as 
originally envisioned, by the time the internal market was abolished (NCO, 1997). 
The technical shortcomings of NHS costing systems can partly explain why doctors 
by and large failed to engage with cost accounting. The cost information produced 
was often not accurate or relevant enough in order to support medical decision 
making. In particular, the inability of hospital costing systems to account for the 
quality of medical care was frequently emphasised as a key deficiency in this context 
(e.g. Dearsden, 1990; NHS Executive, 1996). However, the historical nature of the 
NHS is also argued to constitute an important reason why British doctors developed 
little enthusiasm for accounting. In the USA, doctors had always been entrepreneurs 
as well as clinicians, whose success depended as much on business skills as on 
medical acumen (Starr, 1982). In the NHS, hospital doctors were salaried employees. 
Emphasis was placed, above all, on clinicians’ medical performance. As a result, NHS 
doctors, with only a small number of exceptions (e.g. Mosley and Fairbanks, 1992), 
neither had the skills nor the interest to engage with financial information (Buckland, 
1994; Jones and Dewing, 1997).  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the history of health-care rationing in the British NHS with 
special reference to the role of hospital accounting in this context. With regard to the 
history of rationing, it has traced the initial emergence of concerns regarding health-
care rationing to the application of economic theories to the health services (Cooper, 
1975; Powell, 1966). These sources suggested that in a service which was free at the 
point of use, patients would demand infinite amounts of health care. This study has 
argued that, during this period, the NHS did not conform to such theories as powerful 
doctors rather than patients determined the demand for health care. Health-care 
rationing only emerged as an issue of wider social concern in the wake of the 
Working for Patients White Paper (DoH, 1989), which aimed to weaken the power of 
the medical profession, emancipate health-care consumers and introduce market 
forces into the British health-care system. In an NHS which increasingly came to 
resemble economists’ models of health services, empowered patients rather than 
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medical professionals would determine the demand for health care. It was against this 
background that health-care rationing came to be seen as inevitable in the UK.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that the emergence of concerns regarding health-
care rationing was not, as often claimed, an inevitable consequence of ageing 
populations and technological progress. Instead, it would appear that such concerns 
depend on very specific notions of patients, doctors and their interactions which only 
gained wider traction in Britain in response to the neo-liberal health service reforms 
set out in the Working for Patients White Paper (DoH, 1989).  
 
Unlike in the USA, where DRGs were at the heart of resourcing and rationing health 
care (Fleck, 1987; Preston, Chua and New, 1997), in the NHS, the role of accounting 
in this respect remained limited between 1948 and 1997. British politicians, 
administrators and health policy experts have periodically looked towards accounting 
as a mechanism for more effective resource allocation in the NHS, but neither the 
departmental costing system (MoH, 1955), nor various clinical budgeting experiments 
(e.g. DHSS, 1983) or costing for contracting initiatives (e.g. NHS Executive, 1993a) 
have fulfilled these aspirations. This research has identified an under-developed 
information infrastructure as well as apathy, if not outright hostility, among doctors as 
significant factors in this context and linked both of them to the historically 
nationalised and non-commercial nature of the NHS.  
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1
 Whilst, generally, health expenditure as a proportion of GDP has tended to increase during this 
period, the increase has been far from linear. By 1960, health expenditure had fallen to 3.1% of GDP, 
from where it increased to 5% by 1980. Under the Thatcher government, health expenditure declined to 
4.7% of GDP in 1990. The 1990s saw a small increase to 5.5%, whilst Labour’s investment in the NHS 
during the 2000s took health expenditure to just over 8% of GDP by 2010 (Harker, 2012).  
2
 Diagnosis Related Groups are a system which classifies hospital cases into one of 467 groups. These 
groups, which are homogeneous in medical and resource consumption terms, formed the basis of the 
prospective reimbursement system adopted by the US government to fund the Medicare programme 
from 1983 onwards.  
3
 The Hospital changed its name to Hospital and Health Services Review in 1972 and Health Services 
Management in 1988.  
4
 By comparison, in 2012-2013 alone more than 16000 medical negligence claims were lodged against 
the NHS (Donnelly, 2013).  
5
 Some of the British doctors interviewed by Aaron and Schwartz made similar points. One suggested 
that it ‘seems very seldom that the U.S. physician ever states that there is no surgery that would help, 
no drug that is advantageous, and no further investigation that is required. There seems to be an 
irresistible urge always to do something, even though in many cases the doctor concerned must realise 
that there is no possibility of benefit.’ (cited in Aaron and Schwartz, 1984: 66) 
6
 Healthcare Resource Groups are the UK version of DRGs.  
